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The four objectives addressed were the description of
credit scoring development, the identification of management
uses and attendant disadvantages of scoring, an evaluation
of the current and potential uses of scoring in banks and
credit unions, and the determination of whether military
servicemen are adversely affected by scoring.
The conclusions reached were that the advantages of
scoring appear to especially outweigh the disadvantages for
large volume lending institutions with access to computers.
A survey of the country's 100 largest banks and 100 largest
federal credit unions indicated an apparent slowing of scor-
ing growth. A sample of automobile loans of active duty
servicemen scored on the systems of two commercial banks and
one credit union provided limited evidence that servicemen
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I. INTRODUCTION
The growth of consumer credit has been steadily increas-
ing since the 1920 's and has shown a particular rapid increase
since 1945. During the twenties and thirties, the purchase
of automobiles by installments became popular. Sales Finance
Companies sprang up and Banks began to establish large con-
sumer loan departments. World War II caused a temporary
lessening of consumer credit because of a lack of consumer
goods. After the war, goods became more plentiful and sev-
eral other factors changed. People began moving into urban
areas, their discretionary income increased, and they began
making increased demands for consumer goods. The stigma of
buying on time was removed as more and more Americans became
interested in "buy now, pay later" plans. Manufacturers
were quick to realize that the increased demand for consumer
goods was going to mean higher profits. They reacted by
instituting wide sweeping advertising compaigns and other
promotional techniques to insure that their products were
known. Thus the desires of the consumer and the salesmanship
of manufacturers combined to cause the growth of consumer
credit. Diagram 1 tracks this growth from some $8 billion
in 1940 to over $161 billion in 1973 (~Ref. 1, Table A54]
.
This rapid growth has forced management methods to change in
the consumer finance industry. New management techniques
have been developed and old methods discarded. One of these











































Certain aspects of credit scoring will be examined in
this study while fulfilling four specific objectives. These
objectives are:
a. Describe the development of credit scoring.
b. Identify the management uses and attendant disadvan-
tages of scoring.
c. Evaluate both current and potential uses of scoring
in banks and credit unions.
d. Determine if servicemen are adversely affected by
scoring.
Part II of the study specifically addresses the first
objective of describing the development of credit scoring.
The authors define credit scoring and the factors that are
involved in developing a system. The ideas that led to its
conception and eventual growth are then explored. The sources
of this examination included extensive library research and
numerous field interviews with consumer credit personnel.
Parts III and IV of the study address the second of the
objectives, that of identifying the management uses and dis-
advantages of credit scoring. Here again the primary sources
of information were library research and field interviews.
The third objective, that of evaluating the current and
potential usage of credit scoring, is addressed in Part V.
The authors conducted a mail survey of the 100 largest banks
and the 100 largest federal credit unions. Questions were
designed to determine the degree of use of scoring among
these groups and whether evidence existed demonstrating that

improved operations resulted from scoring. It should be
emphasized that the authors limited their attention to bank
and credit union use of scoring. Other users of scoring
such as major credit card issuers, mail-order catalog compan-
ies, finance companies, and major retailers were not surveyed.
The survey appears to indicate that use of credit scoring by
banks is in a period of stagnation or perhaps decline. Be-
cause so few credit unions were found to be using scoring
it is difficult to make a statement regarding its state of
growth within these institutions.
The last objective, that of determining if servicemen
are adversely affected by these credit scoring systems, is
addressed in Part VI. A sample of good loans, bad loans,
and turned-down loans of active duty servicemen was drawn
from a small local credit union. This sample was then scored
by the systems of two large commercial banks and one large
credit union. The results were analyzed to test the hypoth-
esis that servicemen are discriminated against by credit
scoring systems. All of the sample loans were obtained for
the purpose of purchasing an automobile. Automobiles now
comprise approximately 40% of the total consumer installment
credit outstanding. They are handled quite routinely and
are a very profitable portion of a consumer lending institu-
tion's loan portfolio. Different types of loans can result
in substantially different amounts of risk. To illustrate,
a home improvement loan is less risky than a loan for a vaca-
tion or car repairs. By restricting the sample to automobile

loans these variations in risk for type of loan have been
reduced.
A key factor in such a sample is the definition of "bad
loans". Bad loans in this study are defined as loans that,
at least once during the loan period, have been 60 or more
consecutive days late in payment. This is a rather narrow
definition in that such loans may still be quite profitable
for the lending institution. Part VI discusses in depth the
definitions and the sizes of the sample loan categories.
The results of the scoring of the good loans, bad loans,
and turn-down loans of each of the three lending institutions
are broken down into enlisted/officer and new car/used car
categories. The analysis made of the results examines the
acceptance and rejection of the good loan, bad loan, and
turn-down portions of the sample. It also includes an over-
all test to evaluate which system does the best job of dis-
criminating between the good and bad loans.
The authors then perform some sensitivity testing by
varying the points allocated by the scoring systems on cer-
tain questions identified as being possibly adverse to the
military servicemen. Another overall test of each system's
ability to discriminate between the good and bad loans is
conducted with the new scoring results that do not include
the possibly adverse questions.
Each of the parts of the study addresses one of the ob-
jectives. Part VI provides limited evidence that servicemen
are not treated fairly overall by credit scoring. It provides
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an indication of areas or particular questions that tend to
lower servicemen's scores in relation to the scores of civil-
ian counterparts. The survey discussed in Part V indicates
an apparent slowing of scoring growth among banks. The con-
clusions reached in Part II of the study indicated that the
processing of large volume loan transactions has been consid-
erably eased in terms of time and expense by the advent of
the computer. The advantages of the uses of credit scoring
would appear from Parts III and IV to outweigh the disadvan-
tages for institutions handling an increasingly larger volume
of consumer loans.
II. HISTORY OF CREDIT SCORING
A. WHAT IS CREDIT SCORING?
Credit scoring is a numerical method that quantifies the
characteristics of loan applicants. Personal factors such
as age, occupation, salary, previous credit dealings, along
with other information appearing on the normal loan applica-
tion are weighed and assigned points based primarily on loan
repayment history experienced by the lending institution.
The points are added and a single numerical value is deter-
mined. An example of a typical score sheet is provided in
Appendix A. From the single numerical value the loan officer
can make one of the following decisions: a) grant the loan
with no further investigation, b) request further information,
or c) turn down the loan. This chain of events is illus-
























By use of a scoring system loan personnel are better able
to identify certain types of borrowers who are likely to be-
come future collection problems. These people are normally
turned down without further investigation. The system also
attempts to identify those potential borrowers with outstand-
ing credit characteristics. These people are normally granted
loans with the bare minimum of further investigation (i.e.,
verify address and employment) . Finally, the scoring system
identifies people with those characteristics good enough to
pass the scoring criteria but who do not have high enough
scores to be granted loans with minimum investigations. This
category of applicant can be further investigated by normal
credit investigative methods such as contacting the local
credit bureau for a credit report. It should be pointed out
that scoring systems normally permit loan officers to occa-
sionally override the score and grant credit to applicants
with failing scores and refuse credit to applicants with high
scores. Such action usually requires written justification.
12

B. DEVELOPING A SYSTEM
1. General
There are a number of statistical techniques that
can be used to develop a credit scoring system. Systems have
been devised through the use of multiple regression analysis,
discriminant analysis, and Bayesian theory. Regardless of
which method is used some combination of the following seven
steps is normally followed:
a. Based on his judgment and experience, have a
credit man list those characteristics of a credit applicant
that mi ht be relevant to a decision.
b. Have the credit man set forth an unambiguous
definition of a good account and a bad account.
c. Select a statistical sample of good accounts and
bad accounts.
d. Pull information relating to sample accounts
from the file.
e. Through statistical techniques screen out non-
discriminating characteristics of sample information. Use
those characteristics that discriminate to develop a risk
index by assigning weights to each characteristic.
f. Determine discriminating ability of the index
for a s?mple of good and bad accounts. This can be done by
actually scoring some good and bad accounts and then tabula-
ting the results. An example of a risk index with an actual
tabulation of good and bad accounts follows. (The index
along with a thorough discussion of developing a scoring
13

system, appeared in a 1966 article in Credit World by G. J
Glasser JRef. 2] .
)
Bad Good
"Value of Index Accounts Accounts Total
10-19.9 6 1 7
20-29.9 22 11 33
30-39.9 20 20 40
40-49.9 18 46 64
50-59.9 10 84 94





g. Determine cutoff score rejection criteria on such
bases as the average cost of accepting a bad account, the
opportunity loss of rejecting a good account, and the rela-
tive frequency with which potentially bad accounts apply for
loans
.
The cutoff score is determined by finding the bad
account probability where a decision-maker is indifferent to
either granting a loan or turning it down. Cohen and Hammer
/Ref. 3, p. 149J provide the following method for finding
the indifference probability. Let p = probability of bad
account, R = average return on good account, and L = average
loss on bad account. Then at the indifference probability,
pL = (l-p)R which reduces to p = R/(L+R). It should be
pointed out that it is normally not an easy matter to deter-
mine the average loss or average return. Only by having
14

cost accounting procedures that report costs at a level of
detail precise enough to include the expenses of writing
delinquency letters, making phone calls on delinquent ac-
counts, identifying collection expenses, etc., can an accurate
determination of average return and average loss be made.
To illustrate the use of the formulas, suppose that
the average return on a good account was $20 and the average
loss on a bad account was $180. Solving for p we get:
p = R/(L+R)
,
p = 20/(180 + 20)
,
p = 20/200, which reduces to
p = .1.
Hence the cutoff score would be that score where the prob-
ability of receiving a bad account was .1. In the above
table the cutoff score would be between index value 50-69.9.
This is true since 10/94 (probability of bad account in 50-
59.9 range) equals .106 and 9/138 (probability of bad account
in 60-69.9 range) equals .065. The point p = .1 is clearly
somewhere between .06 5 and .106.
2 . Requirements for an effective system
Besides being able to discriminate between potential
good and bad accounts, a scoring system must have other attri-
butes in order to be effective. The system must be capable
of being easily updated and must be simple enough for opera-
ting personnel to understand. It should be able to provide
management with controls over branches and other organiza-
tional sub-units. Finally, the system should provide an
early warning of the accounts likely to become delinquent.
15

Because installing a credit scoring system is not an
easy matter, a large number of users have management consult-
ing firms develop and install their systems.
3. Obstacles in introduction
Large changes in day-to-day business operations such
as going from a primarily subjective evaluation of credit
risks to the more objective evaluation through credit scoring
are not implemented without overcoming obstacles. Getting
management to try credit scoring is sometimes hard. Once
management gives approval, other obstacles are encountered
in actual installation of a system.
Management initially may be of the opinion that in-
stalling a system will upset morale and that the credit staff
may see the system as a threat to their job security. Al-
though it is true that morale may suffer at the outset, ex-
perience has shown that after credit personnel become familiar
with scoring techniques, they eventually consider these tech-
niques as additional tools to assist them in their work.
The belief that the system is too complex for the
credit staff to handle and that additional time and expense
will be required is often voiced by management. It has been
generally shown however that scoring is simple and can save
time and expense. A more thorough discussion of the benefits




Having a credit scoring system installed normally
costs somewhere between $3,500 and $50,000 according to a
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1969 National Retail Furniture Association report /Ref . 4] .
Current information provided to the authors by a consulting
firm prominent in the credit scoring field indicated that
the installation costs of most of the systems they installed
were in the $20,000 to $30,000 range.
While the installation charges may appear insignifi-
cant to the large firm, the small firm may view them as pro-
hibitive. The large firm may be able to quickly recoup the
charges by increased efficiency in their operations (e.g.,
loan officers may be able to process more loans each day,*
credit bureau costs may be reduced, etc.). It may take a
much longer time for the small firm to recoup its installa-
tion charges due to their limited volume of credit transac-
tions. It would appear that scoring is not necessarily a
good idea for firms of all sizes.
C. CONCEPTION AND GROWTH
Credit scoring is not a new concept. Although it is true
that scoring has been extensively used only recently, its
roots go back more than thirty years. The first published
study dealing with this concept was by David Durand in 1941
£Ref. 5j . Durand analyzed hundreds of both good and bad
loans from the files of commercial banks, finance companies,
and industrial banking institutions. Through the use of
discriminant analysis he developed weighting factors for these
accounts and was able to predict good and bad payment results.
In 1949 Wolbers did a study of a branch of a nationwide de-
partment store /Ref. 6j . He was able to show that credit
17

losses could be reduced significantly with little loss in
sales volume. Reduction of credit losses by 20 percent with
one 1 percent loss of sales volume was shown by McGrath in
1960 when he did a study for an automobile dealer JRef . 7/ .
In the 1960's interest in scoring became widespread in
the credit industry. This was evidenced by articles appear-
ing in credit and banking periodicals and credit scoring
systems becoming common place techniques in lending institu-
tions. System usage spread from nationwide consumer finance
companies to nationwide department stores, and finally to
banks. Additionally, major oil companies began using these
systems as did catalog sales companies. During the 1960's
management consulting firms became interested in credit scor-
ing and there are now a number of firms that actively seek
clients desiring credit scoring systems.
D. REASONS FOR GROWTH
Credit scoring, like many other modern management science
techniques, has grown primarily because of the increasingly
recent widespread usage of computers. Such concepts as
multiple regression analysis and discriminate analysis can
easily be used to determine scoring weights through use of
computers. It was not feasible to apply such techniques be-
fore the computer was introduced. The computer additionally
can provide a wide variety of management reports resulting




Scoring has also grown because larger credit institutions
have had to become increasingly more impersonal in their
dealings with their customers. The impersonal relationship
has been caused by the tremendous growth in the volume of
credit and the high cost of administering a credit operation.
To illustrate, major oil dealers and sales catalog companies
both extend credit based on applications sent by mail. It
is possible, and very often the case, that credit is extended
without the customer and a representative of the firm ever
engaging in face-to- face conversation. Banks have relation-
ships w:',th firms such as auto dealers and furniture and
appliance stores in which they purchase sales contracts of
customers who will probably never set foot inside the bank.
Evidently it is either no longer possible, nor necessarily
cost-effective for a credit officer to always size up the
credit applicant through a personal interview. Scoring can
assist credit granters in making decisions where no interview
is possible since the concept is designed to use only the
limited information appearing on a properly-filled-in credit
application blank.
Administrative expenses connected with operating a credit
organization have been rising. Salaries, rent, telephone
expenses, and other costs have increased at such a rate as
to necessitate economies in other parts of the credit opera-
tion in order to maintain the same profit margins. Scoring
has been shown to reduce personnel costs, credit bureau ex-
penses, and other administrative costs. A more thorough
19

examination of these savings is presented in Part III of this
study.
In summary, the trend of impersonal business relation-
ships coupled with the high cost of administering a credit
operation has made credit scoring a concept that would appear
to have potential for a promising future.
III. MANAGEMENT USES OF CREDIT SCORING
A. GENERAL
One of the strongest features of credit scoring systems
is the^ fact that multiple management uses can be made from
them. Not only are potentially good applicants selected and
potentially bad risks rejected through scoring but the sys-
tem also provides managers with data that can be used in
other parts of the business. This study groups the manage-
ment uses into six categories. In a discussion of these six
categories scoring is examined as a decision-making tool, in
credit control, in portfolio analysis, in training, in mar-
keting, and in minor roles of a general nature.
B. DECISION-MAKING TOOL
Credit scoring is used by some firms as primarily a deci-
sion-making tool. To illustrate, decisions on whether or
not to grant credit can be made based on a credit score.
Further, scoring can be used to set time and dollar ceiling
limits for credit cards, determine the amount of deposit re-
quired for establishing a home utility account, determine
20

credit investigation depth, determine the level at which cred-
it decisions are made, and can be used to determine collec-
tion action for delinquent accounts.
1. Credit Authorization
The most widespread use of scoring is in the area of
making decisions regarding the granting of credit. Using a
score as a guide, a loan officer can easily weigh the risk
connected with the transaction and quickly make a decision.
This decision will hopefully result in the lending institu-
tion accepting that mix of applicants which maximize the
firm's profit.
The credit manager has a trade off problem when mak-
ing decisions regarding granting of credit. First of all,
he does not want to authorize credit to those applicants
likely to either default on their loans or will prove to be
so expensive to administer that no profit will be made from
the transaction. Additionally, he does not want to refuse
credit to those applicants likely to be good risks and from
whom a profit can be made . Hence, if the credit manager sets
his credit standards too loose, bad risks will be granted
loans. By the same token, if he sets his standards too tight,
good business will be turned away.
Evidence has been gathered that substantiates the
claim that scoring can reduce write-offs without adversely
affecting total business volume. The National Retail Furni-
ture Association (NRFA) special report on credit scoring
previously cited indicated that several large furniture
21

chains had reduced bad debt write-offs through scoring uRef
.
4J . One of the firms was California based and reduced bad
debt losses by one-half while reducing repossessions by 25-30
percent between 1960-1969. This was done in spite of the
constant fluctuation of people moving in and out of California
and loose bankruptcy laws. No information regarding the
affect on total volume was given. In this same NRFA report,
the controller of a midwestern furniture company reported
that his firm had, in a 12 month period, reduced write-offs
from $40,000 per year to $20,000 per year with a 1% drop in
volume, by installing a credit scoring system. He emphasized
that normally a $20,000 profit increase takes $400,000 in
additional sales, assuming 5% return on net sales. Reducing
the write-offs was probably a much easier task than promoting
$400,000 in additional sales.
The American Investment Company, a nationwide finance
company operating from over 800 offices, reported a reduction
in write-off expense after instituting their scoring system
/Ref . 8/ . They reported that at the same time industry write-
off rates were rising, they had lowered their 1970 write-off
figure by 20.2 percent when compared with their past rates.
The write-off expenses were decreased during a period when
AIC was growing in volume. This would appear to indicate
that the reduction in write-off costs did not occur at the
expense of total loan dollar volume.
The survey conducted as part of this study indicated
that write-off expenses can be reduced through scoring.
22

Thirty-seven percent of the banks and two of five credit
unions responding to the survey indicated that they had shown
an improved loss ratio after instituting a scoring system.
As a decision-making tool scoring can also be used
to increase total business volume. It does this by accepting
a number of potentially good customers who would have been
denied credit under past systems. Like most people, credit
officers have their personal prejudices and these prejudices
often result in denying credit to potential good customers.
To illustrate, there was a recent case where a new credit
manager, assigned to the Las Vegas district of a national de-
partment store raised the store's rejection rate because he
frequently denied credit to employees of the gambling industry
because of their occupation. Later when a scoring system was
installed, it was shown that employees of the gambling indus-
try were among the best credit risks. This example, borrowed
from a 1969 Stores magazine article by Presby and Simon,
/Ref. 9J , demonstrates what can happen when decisions are
made based on erroneous preconceived notions.
To summarize, credit scoring when properly used, can
eliminate a significant number of potential write-offs with-
out adversely affecting total business volume. This is be-
cause scoring not only identifies potential poor risks, it
also identifies potential good risks who may have been denied
credit under other methods of credit decision-making.
2 . Credit Ceiling
The uniform setting of both credit dollar limits and
time limits for repayment can be accomplished through scoring
23

use. The credit score indicates the relative amount of risk
associated with a particular applicant as determined by the
firm's history of prior customers with similar characteris-
tics. Without scoring retailing firms frequently are overly
conservative when initially authorizing credit, and tend to
make the initial ceiling very low. This conservatism can
result in lost sales. Sometimes the amount of the proposed
i
transaction actually sets the credit limit. In this case a
higher risk applicant is less likely to have a sufficient
downpayment and may end up with a higher credit limit than
a lower ri :k applicant.
A credit scoring system can provide a scale of credit
risk from which credit limits can be assigned. Thus, the
retailer is provided a standard from which to judge if the
value of a particular transaction exceeds an applicant's
ability to pay. He can also encourage sales by assigning
low risk applicants high credit limits. Once the system is
established new customers can easily be assigned credit ceil-
ings. Later their payment records can be reviewed and the
ceiling adjusted based on actual payment performance.
Scoring can also be used in determining time limits
for credit cards. Those applicants with high scores can be
issued the cards for extended periods of time, while marginal
risks with low scores can be issued cards for more restric-
tive periods.
Another potential use of scoring in the area of de-
cision-making is that of using scoring for determining amounts
24

of deposit for utility companies. Companies may not find it
necessary for high scoring applicants to make deposits since
little risk to the company is involved with this category of
customer.
3. Extent of Investigation
Decisions regarding the extent of credit investiga-
tion required for applicants can be made through the use of
scoring. Both outside credit bureau expenses and local in-
vestigation expenses are significant in most consumer credit
operations. A concept that uses two cutoff scores can be
used in determining the degree of credit investigation.
Applicants scoring less than the low cutoff score are refused
credit with no investigation while applicants scoring above
the high cutoff score are granted credit after a minimum in-
vestigation such as a phone call verifying employment. Those
applicants scoring between the low and high cutoff scores
are investigated in whatever detail necessary when using
this arrangement.
The extent of investigation can be a dynamic variable.
There is a constant danger that once the borrowing public
finds out that certain answers to questions mean the differ-
ance between receiving or not receiving credit, they may learn
to lie intelligently on the credit application. This would
result in applicants receiving credit that they would not
have warranted if they had been truthful.
The problem of fraudulent application blanks with the
likely increase in write-offs that would follow, is a matter
25

that must be considered before lessening the depth of credit
investigations
.
Several examples of saving investigation costs when
using scoring can be given. Presby and Simon reported an
elimination of one-half of the credit bureau costs of a large
high-style department store in New York City after scoring
had been implemented /Ref. 9J . The savings resulted from
using better criteria that was gained through scoring to
determine investigation requirements.
The American Investment Company reported that they
estimated . n annual savings of up to 125,000 hours in local
investigation time after implementing scoring while the Na-
tional Retail Furniture Association Special Report previously
cited reported that one furniture finance company reduced
credit bureau expenses by $60,000 annually after implementing
scoring iRefs. 10, 4j .
Along with expense, credit processing time can also
be reduced through scoring. Customers making large purchases
such as TV sets or automobiles do not want to have to wait
several days for credit approval. Processing time could be
dramatically improved if a system could be devised that pro-
vided for near instant credit approval in a large percentage
of cases. Obviously no system can be devised that will accept
or reject instantly all potential borrowers. But it is pos-
sible to quickly isolate a good percentage of potential bor-
rowers into two categories of good and bad risks where credit
can be almost instantly granted or turned down.
26

The reduction of credit processing time is a major
selling point of credit scoring and evidence exists that time
has been reduced by scoring. For example, Boggess in a 196 7
Harvard Business Review article reported that with a scoring
system he examined that the average credit approval cycle
time had been reduced from a week to 24 hours /Ref . Ill
.
In summary, one of the consequences of credit scor-
ing is the reduction of credit investigation costs and time.
This is accomplished by being more selective in asking for
credit bureau information and by streamlining local credit
approval processes.
4 . Lower Level Decisions
Scoring can permit credit decisions to be made at
lower levels in the organization. An experienced credit
analyst's time is important and must be used efficiently.
Besides making decisions regarding the granting of credit
the analyst is also concerned with the examination of mar-
ginal accounts, with business and sales calls, and perform-
ing other managerial duties. Credit scoring frees the
analyst from much of the time-consuming work of examining
loan applications since a good percentage of the applications
can be either turned down or approved by lower level person-
nel. As previously pointed out, the low scoring applicant
can be refused credit based on his score. At the same time
the high scoring applicant can be granted credit after a
phone call verifying employment. Since these two categories
of applicants can make up as much as 20-30 percent of customers,
27

the elimination of the need for an experienced analyst to
examine their applications closely is of major consequence.
5. Collection Effort
No matter how hard management may try, they will
never completely eliminate delinquencies or write-offs.
Since these two sore spots will continue to be a part of the
credit business for the foreseeable future, a continued at-
tempt must be made to identify potential delinquencies and
write-offs early, and then select the proper collection ac-
tivity for each case.
Credit scoring can be used both for the early identi-
fication of high potential losses, and the selection of the
best collection activity. Since those loans with the lowest
scores are the most likely to be potential problems, they
should receive the most attention in their early payment
stages. Some sort of automatic review of low score credit
transactions during the early payment stage can be made since
scoring readily identifies these accounts.
If a loan is delinquent enough to be sent to the
collection department, the fact that it has a score will
give the collection manager some idea of what collection pro-
cedure he should use. Those delinquent accounts with high
scores would normally get a gentle nudge in the initial col-
lection effort while those accounts with low scores may re-
quire strong collection efforts from the outset. Obviously
the score alone cannot direct collection efforts, but the





It would follow that scoring can help avoid the ill
feeling of top quality customers who are often victims of
overly intensive collection efforts when they are only slight-
ly delinquent.
The use of credit scoring for determining collection
effort has wide usage. Banks, credit unions, finance com-
panies, and other lending institutions have indicated that
they use scoring for this purpose.
C. CREDIT CONTROL
Credit scoring can pay important dividends in the area
of credit control. Through scoring management can adjust
credit tightness in a uniform manner, establish credit lim-
its, exercise control over branch offices, appraise loan
personnel performance and monitor dealer relationships.
The general arguments that uniformity and strict control •
may not always be desirable management objectives will not
be addressed at any length in this paper. The degree of con-
trol that individual organizations wish to establish may vary
from very strict to laissez faire. Regardless of what sort
of control standards are evident, scoring provides manage-
ment with at least the option of having degrees of strict-
ness in their controls.
1 . Credit Tightness
A problem constantly facing credit managers is that
of adjusting credit tightness. There are times when manage-
ment wishes to make credit more difficult and there are times
when easy credit is desired. How does management convey its
29

wishes to loan officers in these situations? Simply telling
loan personnel that credit should be loosened or tightened
leaves the interpretation of this desire open to each indi-
vidual loan officer.
Those firms which have a credit scoring system in-
stalled can easily and uniformly regulate credit tightness.
When management desires to tighten credit, the cutoff score
can be raised. By the same token, when credit should be
eased the score can be lowered. By use of scoring, credit
tightness is not only uniformly adjusted it is adjusted in a
manner that insures that the firm continues to maximize prof-
it. This is true because when the score is lowered only the
best of the former bad risks are given credit. By the same
token when the score is raised only the worst of the former
good risks are denied credit.
2 . Branch Offices
Communicating changes in credit policy to branch of-
fices is normally a difficult task for headquarter ' s manage-
ment to accomplish. The phrases "tighten up on credit",
"loosen credit", "too many marginal loans are being granted",
mean different things to different people. Instructions such
as "lower the cutoff score from 30 to 28", "raise the cutoff
score from 25 to 27", "your average score per dollar loaned
last month decreased from 28.6 to 28.2", are a lot more mean-
ingful and will stand a good chance of being interpreted uni-
formly in the field. Lowering a cutoff score from 30 to 2 8
or raising a cutoff score from 25 to 27 means the same thing
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to each branch manager. Likewise telling a branch manager
that he is loaning out money to more risky applicants than
before is easily communicated by telling him that his average
score per dollar loaned has decreased. Uniform understanding
of instructions coming from headquarters is essential in
large lending operations with many branches involved.
The easing of credit restrictions at one branch and
the raising of restrictions at another branch is sometimes
desired. For example, when write-offs are high in a branch,
management may want to raise the cutoff score while in those
cases when write-offs are below average and loan volume is
low in relation to potential, the cutoff score should perhaps
be lowered. Scoring provides for easy communication of such
changes from head offices to the various branches concerned.
Several examples of scoring being used in branch con-
trol operations can be given. The First Pennsylvania Banking
and Trust Company reported favorable results in this area.
Scoring was providing management with reports that gave de-
tailed information covering the overall performance of every
office, every region, and every individual branch lending
officer fiefs. 12, 13j .
The application of scoring for branch control in
multi-branch furniture chain operations has been reported
/Ref . 4_/ . Scoring appeared to be an answer to the problem
of delegation of authority for granting credit and setting




Evaluating the performance of individual loan officers
is at times a difficult thing. Should they be measured on
the basis of the number of bad loans they approved? The prof-
it they generated for the firm? Their total loan dollar
value? All these measures have problems associated with them.
If a loan officer is criticized for the number of bad loans
he grants, he may become overly conservative. If he is graded
based on the total profit he generates, those loan officers
at the best offices will receive higher marks than those at
the poorer, offices. Finally, if he is graded on the basis
of total dollar value of loans granted he may be prone to
accept too many poor risks.
Through credit scoring some of the above problems
can be overcome because scoring helps in isolating bad credit
decisions. When loans go bad where the applicant clearly
had a passing score, the loan officer should ordinarily not
be criticized. On the other hand when loans go bad on appli-
cants, who in spite of failing scores were granted loans,
criticism is often appropriate. As was previously pointed
out, most scoring systems provide for granting credit to
applicants with failing scores and turning down of credit to
applicants with passing scores, but only with some written
justification.
It can be seen that by reviewing the written justifi-
cation offered by loan officers a manager can get some feel-
ing regarding their performance. In short, he can tell which
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loan officer is using the right reasons for turning down or
approving loans that go counter to the scoring system.
When First Pennsylvania Banking and Trust Company
first implemented credit scoring some surprising early results
were seen (_Ref. 13J . First Pennsylvania's first delinquency
report under credit scoring indicated a total of 16 past due
accounts and that five of the 16 accounts had been approved
by the same loan officer. To make matters worse all five
had been approved despite failing scores. Examples such as
the above readily demonstrate the value of credit scoring
and its associated reports in highlighting unsatisfactory
performance.
4 . Dealer Relationships
It is common practice today for sales finance com-
panies and banks to have relationships with such organizations
as automobile dealerships and furniture stores in which the
lending institution buy sales contracts from the retailer.
Loans under this form of operation are called indirect loans.
The relationship works as follows. A customer buys a product
such as a car and desires financing. The auto dealership
has the customer apply for credit by filling out a credit
application and by completing a sales contract. The sales
contract is subsequently sold to a sales finance company
such as the General Motors Acceptance Corporation or to a
bank. The sales finance company or bank has previously agreed
to buy all dealer paper under certain conditions. The cus-
tomer is then sent a payment book, the lending institution
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picks up title to the auto, and the customer sends in payments
to the bank or finance company, not to the dealer. In most
cases the lending institution never sees the applicant in
person and for that reason no credit interview is performed
by the lending institution.
Credit scoring can be very helpful in the dealer re-
lationship area. Since no interview is performed, and since
the sales contracts are many in number and are handled on an
assembly line basis, credit scoring has obvious benefits.
Loans can quickly be scored and can be acted on without inter-
view. Add ' tionally , costs are reduced since decisions are
made on the basis of a score computed by a low-salaried clerk.
High level management action is required only in non-routine
cases
.
The actual granting of the loan is not the only area
in the dealership operation where credit scoring is appli-
cable. Better control over the dealer can be had through
scoring by raising the cutoff score for those dealers who
have high delinquency rates, and by lowering the score for
low delinquency dealers. It was often difficult to make a
decision regarding discarding a dealer when experience indi-
cated a continuing high delinquency rate. Often the dealer
was discarded too early after his delinquency rate became
unsatisfactory. A better decision than dropping the dealer
would be to raise his cutoff score gradually until satisfac-
tory delinquency rates are reached. If problems continue,
then clearly the dealer would have to be dropped.
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To summarize, dealer control is an area where scor-
ing can be used to produce significant results. Dealer per-
formance can be easily monitored and prompt action can be
taken where warranted. Control of this nature is not readily
available without scoring.
D. PORTFOLIO ANALYSIS
The quality of a lending institution's consumer loan
portfolio is constantly changing. The change is difficult
to analyze inasmuch as thousands of loans are involved and
there is often no provision for measuring the changing degree
of risk for the mix of loans.
By scoring and assigning a single numerical figure to
each loan, the current quality of the portfolio can be ap-
praised. It can be appraised by month, by branch, by geo-
graphic area, or by total portfolio. One can, for example,
compute the average dollar score for loans in total. It is
important to note that the average score per applicant is
not a good measure of portfolio quality since applicants
borrow different sums of money. A simple example provided
by Johnson in Ref. 14 will illustrate the difference between
the average dollar score and the average applicant score.
Applicant Score Loan
No. 1 90 $1,000
No. 2 60 $2,000
Average score per applicant: 75
Average score per dollar: 70
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As can be seen from the above illustration, although each
applicant averaged a score of 75 (150/2 = 75) the average
dollar score was only 70, {(90 x 1000) + (60 x 2000)} t 3000 =
70.
If the average score in the above example later dropped
from 70 to 65 for example, an indication of lower quality-
loans being accepted would be apparent. By the same token
if the average score showed a significant increase, it would
indicate that loan personnel were getting overly conservative.
The factor of money availability must be examined also when
evaluating the change in average score per dollar. Obviously
an increase in score per dollar could be due to the non-
availability of money to loan, and not due to conservative
action on the part of individual loan officers.
Without credit scoring management has little basis for
evaluating the quality of a loan portfolio. Loss ratios
show some indication of quality, but this information is
normally after the fact, and does not show current quality.
To further amplify this point an example can be given.
Suppose a customer who eventually ends up as a write-off
receives a loan on 1 January in spite of having a low score.
By 31 January his score's adverse affect on the loan port-
folio quality is already evident since the score and dollars
loaned are now part of the amounts being used to compute the
average score per dollar loaned. Without scoring no affect
on portfolio quality would be shown until an actual loss was
recorded on the lending institution's records which would
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only occur after a considerable time period had elapsed.
This may be two or three years in the future depending on
when the customer stopped paying and the length of time col-
lection efforts were being made.
E. TRAINING
Credit scoring can be very useful in training new loan
personnel. The score card itself has useful information
since it points out the important characteristics of credit
applicants, gives the relative weights of the characteris-
tics, and indicates total criteria needed in order to quali-
fy for credit. During the training period a trainee's deci-
sion made without benefit of a score card can be compared
with results of a scored application. In those instances
where the trainee made a poor decision, the score card quickly
points out the reasons for the poor decision.
Several institutions have reported using scoring as a
training aid. Both the First Pennsylvania Banking and Trust
Company and the First National Bank, Boston, Mass. are among
those using scoring in their training programs ,'Refs. 12,
15j.
F. MARKETING
Marketing efforts by lending institutions are both impor-
tant and costly. New business is constantly being sought
through newspaper ads, TV commercials, direct letter writing,
etc. Having marketing information available on present and
past customers can be helpful in a marketing effort. Credit
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scoring, especially when used with electronic data process-
ing equipment, can easily provide profiles on present and
past customers since the answers to questions on the loan
application give important personal characteristics . For
example, when sending direct advertisements to customers
through the mail it is desirable at times to contact only
certain categories of customers such as only low risks, only
home owners, only married men under 30, only people in cer-
tain occupations, etc. If the information that is scored is
made part of a data base, one can see where it is a simple
matter to extract marketing information from the data base
when needed.
Scoring can be used to develop new markets. A bank may
be experiencing a large number of turndowns and low loan vol-
ume in certain geographical areas. This could indicate a
deficiency in the scoring system for the people located in
these areas. One of the possibilities for increasing the
bank's share of the market without making specific changes
to the scoring system is to lower the cutoff score at the
branches involved. Hopefully, the long run effects of repeat
business from good customers gained, will offset short term
losses incurred from acceptance of the higher risk applicants.
Evidence of firms using scoring as a marketing aid exists.
The American Investment Company uses scoring in a marketing
sense by encouraging their loan personnel to make larger
loans to low risk applicants jRef . 87 . The First Pennsylvania
Bank and Trust Co. has used scoring in their marketing program
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There are several minor uses of scoring that for the sake
of completeness should be discussed. Scoring can insure that
application blanks are fully completed, can make it easier
to predict losses, and can be used as an explanation for
refusing credit.
1. Completed Blanks
Credit scoring has been shown to assist management
in insuring that credit applications are fully completed.
It has been shown that many application forms at lending in-
stitutions using non-scoring credit decision-making methods
are not fully filled out. Often missing information is ig-
nored since it is not absolutely essential for decision-
making. Past studies have shown that applications for loans
that are granted and subsequently written off have a higher
tendency to be incomplete than do applications for loans that
are granted and repaid iRef . 16] . This is probably due to
the fact that in the case of the write-off, the loan officer
made his decision with incomplete information because the
applicant either intentionally or unintentionally left out
unfavorable data. Scoring eliminates the problem of incom-
pleteness because it is normally not possible to compute a





It has been shown that scoring can make it easier for
management to predict losses. This is because scoring sta-
bilizes the loan portfolio by not allowing periodic increases
in bad loans. Additionally, scoring gives management quanti-
tative data for predicting losses by measuring the risk asso-
ciated with each dollar in the loan portfolio. These authors,
while doing the research for this paper, were shown reports
of detailed loss predictions made by a large commercial bank
through the use of scoring. Management personnel at the bank
reported that the ability to predict losses was an extremely
valuable by-product of credit scoring. No evidence verify-
ing the accuracy of the predictions was presented by the
bank.
3. Credit Refusal Explanation
Some users of credit scoring have found that it is
much easier for loan personnel to turn down loans, and it is
easier for applicants to accept the fact that they are not
eligible for credit, when the reason for turndown is a fail-
ing score. With a certain amount of confidence the loan
officer can explain to the customer that he did not meet min-
imum credit standards that are the same for everyone. Under
non-scoring systems it is much harder for the loan officer
to cite reasons for the turndown since normally there is no
single reason, but instead the cumulative effect of several





The credit scoring concept is not without disadvantages.
The disadvantages can be broken down into major and minor
categories. Those of a major category include the fact that
a scoring system must be continuously updated and the fact
that most lending institutions need more than one system.
Shortcomings of a more minor nature are those such as morale
problems resulting from implementing scoring; information on
applications being difficult to verify; certain categories
of people having unusual difficulty in receiving passing
scores; and systems not being founded on correct statistical
populations
.
B. SYSTEM REQUIRES CONSTANT UPDATING
Even the strongest supporters of scoring admit that scor-
ing systems must be updated periodically. A reasonable time
period between updating is on the order of three years, al-
though the update period has been known to fluctuate from 6
months to 10 years depending on the company. The systems re-
quire updating becuase they lose their discriminating ability
after several years. Types of customers may change, salaries
for certain occupations may change, and a whole host of other
reasons make it necessary to periodically update a system.
The update costs approximately one-half the cost of setting
up an initial system, so this cost could approach $25,000
depending upon the type of system being used.
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The significance of changing weight factors was illus-
i— —
I
trated by Boggess iRef. 11/ . The changes he illustrated were
experienced by a system that a retailer (Company X) had used.
Company X's experience was as indicated below:
"CHANGES IN COMPANY X'S CREDIT SCREEN 1964-1967
Credit rating points allowed




Age is 35 or over
Has lived at least 3 yrs
at present address
Has a bank reference
Has a telephone
Has fewer than 3 children
1965 1966 1967
7 8 8 10
20 16 15 15
7 4 9 7
9 9 8 11
13 18 15 14
26 20 21 18
6 9 6 6
12 16 18 19
100 100 100 100"
Company X updated their system every six months by extract-
ing a sample from accounts 9-15 months old. These accounts
were categorized as good or bad, and new weighting factors
were computed based on payment history experienced with the
sample. As can be seen from the. above, changes do occur that
are significant. For example the weight of owning a home
which in 1964 was 20 points r dropped to 15 points by 1966.
The characteristic of having fewer than three children in-
creased from 12 points in 1964 to 19 points in 1967. From
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the above one can see that systems can lose their discrimina-
ting ability over time.
C. MORE THAN ONE SYSTEM REQUIRED
The other major disadvantage of credit scoring is the
fact that more than one system is normally required. To
illustrate, a commercial bank would normally require, as a
minimum, separate systems for the following types of loans:
direct auto, indirect auto, direct cash, and household im-
provement. Theoretically, in addition to the previous break-
down, an organization could have a separate system for each
branch office plus a separate system for new and old custom-
ers. It is apparent that the entire concept becomes unwork-
able if separate systems are required for different types of
loans, different branches, and different customers. Normally
a compromise is reached and an organization has a separate
system for each type of loan and disregards the location of
a branch and the type of customer being scored.
Although the most popular way of categorizing scoring
systems is by type of loan, there are a number of organiza-
tions who also have separate systems based on geography.
This is especially true of nationwide firms who operate in
most of the 50 states. For example, the American Investment
Company has seven different scoring systems based on geogra-
phy /Ref. 8J . As further evidence, the authors of this paper
were told by one management consultant that one large nation-
wide department store chain had 38 different systems based
on geography, type of customer, and type of account.
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Since each separate system must be developed completely
independent of any other system, the costs connected with
having many separate systems can be a major disadvantage to
some firms.
D. MINOR DISADVANTAGES
The morale of loan personnel can suffer when credit scor-
ing is implemented. As previously pointed out many experi-
enced loan officers feel that scoring will replace their
judgment and as a result feel that their security is threat-
ened. Based on ten years of observation of scoring, Roy and
Lewis report that the judgment substitution problem, though
frequent, is normally overcome once loan personnel see how
scoring works and find out that it is simply another tool for
their use iRef. 17] .
The scoring system is only as good as the information
that appears on the loan application blank. As previously
discussed, there is a danger that as the borrowing public be-
comes more familiar with scoring concepts that an increase
in fraudulent applications may result. Verifying all infor-
mation on each application is normally not a feasible answer
to the fraudulent application question. Management is left"
with a problem that has potential serious consequences.
It has been argued that certain categories of people have
extraordinary problems getting passing marks on scoring sys-
tems. People who move a great deal and young people just
starting out in life have problems because most scoring sys-
tems heavily penalize applicants who are not stable or who
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have no credit history. An entire section of this paper is
devoted to this problem so it will not be further discussed
here
.
There are some credit experts who feel strongly that
credit scoring cannot be reliable because they claim that
the proper questions are not asked. Robert W. Johnson of
the National Commission on Consumer Finance felt that the
regular credit application form should include questions such
as: Do you carry life insurance? Are you borrowing on it?
— how much? /Ref. 18/ . The question of an applicant's alco-
holic habits may also be important since the Commission had
found that loans made to alcoholics involved significantly
higher losses than loans made to the overall general popula-
tion. Getting information regarding a person's alcoholic
habits is admittedly not easy, but may be worth the effort
when large amounts of money are involved.
Many scoring schemes are not based on sound statistical
information. That is because the bad and good loan samples
used in computing weights for the system are drawn from a
population of customers who were all granted credit. Infor-
mation on rejectees is normally not included. Since data
computed only from customers previously accepted cannot nor-
mally be validly applied to customers in general, it can be
argued that scoring systems formed on accepted customer data
only, do not apply to the entire population of potential cred-
it customers. Unfortunately there is no way of getting experi-
ence on rejectees because they are refused credit and hence
45

no one knows what percentage of them would have eventually
turned out bad or good. All applicants could be accepted
for a trial period and then experience could be obtained for
all customers. This concept is completely unworkable however,
because during the trial period write-offs would probably
rise at an unsatisfactory rate.
Getting experience on both accepted and rejected appli-
cants is a problem not easily solved. Fair, Isaac and Com-
pany have claimed a major breakthrough by developing a method
that they feel overcomes this problem. An article appearing
in a recent copy of Stores magazine pointed out that a solu-
tion had "been found which enabled the credit grantor to apply
the scoring system correctly to the entire population seeking
credit £Ref . 19] . This breakthrough could be of major signif-
icance in the field of credit scoring. Unfortunately, the
article did not give any details regarding the nature of the






Questionnaires were mailed directly to the 100 largest
U.S. commercial banks and the 100 largest federal credit
unions, ranked in terms of total assets, asking for informa-
tion regarding the use and operating results of scoring. The
questionnaire with forwarding letter is included as Appendix
B.
B. BANK SURVEY RESULTS
Sixty-five of the 100 questionnaires were returned and
found acceptable for use.
Description
1. Category of Use







































As can be seen from the preceding tabulation, 3 7% of the
banks returning the questionnaires were using credit scoring.
This compares with 35% use found by Wilt and Tierney in their
1967 survey of the 200 largest banks /Ref . 16J . A comparison
of the two surveys would indicate a modest 5.7% growth in
scoring use for banks between 1967 and 1973.
A wide variety of loans were being scored by the banks
returning the questionnaires. Some banks used systems for
scoring all types of consumer loans. Other banks scored
direct auto loans, but not recreation vehicles or boats. A
wide combination of uses was apparent, ranging from scoring
all consumer loans to scoring only one type. Types of credit
transactions being scored at banks included: credit card
issuance, revolving credit approval, approval of overdraft
line of credit used in conjunction with checking accounts,
and the issuance of many types of loans such as school loans,
land development loans, and mobile home loans.
It was also apparent that some institutions had a sepa-
rate system for each type of loan, while others had a single
system applicable to all consumer loans. Several banks sent
the authors copies of their scoring systems complete with
instructions for use. Although each system asked basically
the same questions, there was widely different proportional
weights placed on the same answer to a question. For example,
having a telephone could receive as high as 15% of the maxi-
mum score in one case, while receiving less than 5% in another
case. The survey also indicates that there is substantial
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evidence of improved operations by banks using scoring. Fifty-
four percent of those using scoring reported improvement in
general. More specifically, 37% had experienced a drop in
their loss ratio; 42% had experienced a reduction in their
delinquency rate; and 4% had experienced administrative cost
reductions attributable to scoring. In addition to the 13
banks reporting some improvement, there was an additional 9
reporting that, although no concrete evidence had been accu-
mulated showing that scoring had improved their operation,
nevertheless felt improvement had occurred. The fact that
no concrete evidence existed was possibly due to the fact
that some of the institutions had only been using scoring for
short periods, or that their cost accounting system did not
gather the detailed information necessary for a determination
of concrete results. In any event, of the 25 banks reporting
the use of scoring, 22 reported that operations had improved
as a result of having a credit scoring system.
As expected, the length of time that banks had been using
scoring also varied widely. The longest period any bank had
used scoring systems was 14 years. The shortest period was
less than a year. The average length of time was slightly
over five years. It should be pointed out that the year
figures in the previous sentences refer to the time period
for using scoring in general and do not refer to use of a
single system.
Of the sixty-five returning the questionnaires, seven
(11%) reported that, although not having a scoring system in
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use at present, they were considering them. This compares
with 33% considering a system in 1967 when Wilt and Tierney
did their survey. The reduction in the percentage of banks
considering installing scoring since the 1967 survey may be
because of firms initiating systems and then dropping them
for some reason. The fact that 14 of 65 banks returning the
questionnaire stated that they currently were not using scor-
ing after previously trying it lends credence to this idea.
Although the questionnaire did not specifically ask for
reasons for dropping systems, several bank officials gave
reasons anyway. One institution reported that they had used
scoring for one year and since no improvement in operations
had occurred, quit using the system. Another bank official
stated that they had tried scoring and found it to be a com-
plete waste of time, money, and effort. Still another bank
official reported that his bank had quit the regular use of
scoring, but had retained their system to score loans after
the fact in order to observe trends.
It was also reported that a bank's local research effort
had shown that scoring, while beneficial for training, was
not necessarily a good decision-making tool. The results of
the local research effort lead to the bank dropping their
system for decision-making purposes.
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C. CREDIT UNION SURVEY RESULTS
Seventy-three of the 100 questionnaires were returned
and found acceptable for use.
Sample Number
Description Size Using/Reporting
1. Catagory of Use
Loans of some type 73 5 7
Auto 73 4 5
Household Improvement 73 3-4






Improvement in general 5 3 60
Loss ratio 5 2 40
Delinquency rate 5 3 60
Reduction of admin 5 3 60
expense
As can be seen from the above table, only 7% of those
credit unions returning the questionnaires were using scor-
ing. An additional 19% reported that they were presently
considering a system. The limited use of scoring when com-
pared with banks can probably be attributed primarily to the
small size of most credit unions. Furthermore, they do not
have the same operating problems as banks. They retain a
large measure of personal contact with their customers and
do not have the branch control problem of some banks. For
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these reasons, the benefits scoring can give are of less im-
portance to the credit unions than to banks.
The average length of use of scoring was slightly under
six years, with a range of from less than one to ten years.
From the small number of those using credit scoring, im-
provement in operations was reported. Three out of the five
credit unions experienced concrete evidence of improvement
in general, lower delinquency rates, and reduction of admin-
istrative costs. Two out of five had experienced lower loss
ratios
.
The two credit unions that did not have concrete evidence
indicating improvement in operations did report that they had
a general feeling that improvement had occurred. Two credit
unions reported that scoring had resulted in a speed up of
production and loan approval processes. The small sample
size of those using scoring does not permit drawing any firm
conclusions regarding credit union performance when using
scoring. It can be pointed out however, that all users did
report some improvement in operations.
There were five credit unions which reported dropping
scoring after once having tried a system. As in the case of
the banks, this figure is important because it indicates that
a significant number of institutions who try scoring even-
tually drop the concept.
The reasons for dropping scoring were not reported in
all cases, but one firm dropped scoring because the average
loan value had tripled over time. They felt that larger
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loans needed more personal attention. Another firm which had
used scoring for a limited number of loans subsequently aban-
doned the idea.
Several questionnaires elicited interesting general com-
ments. One official reported that his office used a debt-
to-income ratio which he felt indicated the applicant's paying
ability. This figure coupled with other information was ade-
quate for credit decisions. Another official, whose credit
union served predominently military personnel, sent back a
lengthy summary of how his office arrived at credit decisions.
He stated that all their loan officers were retired senior
enlisted men who had ample credit experience. He emphasized
that they know what to do and what not to do without need of
guidelines or standards provided by scoring.
Another credit union official reported that his organi-
zation was considering a scoring system at present but that
they were not sure that scoring would be beneficial. He re-
ported that he doubted that a system could be devised that
could, "protect us against the choir singer who runs off with
the preacher, or the man who takes advantage of the very un-
fair bankruptcy laws to cancel his debts even though he is
working steadily at a good wage and his total indebtedness
is no great burden to him."
These general comments are of some significance and in-
dicate diverse opinions of scoring by credit officials in
the field. Even though credit literature is full of articles
praising the scoring concept, it is apparent that not all
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credit officials in decision-making positions necessarily
agree with the literature.
D. SUMMARY
In Part III of this study many management uses of scor-
ing were identified and several potential cost savings attri-
butable to scoring were examined. These benefits were shown
to far outweigh the disadvantages of scoring and appeared to
indicate that the concept of scoring had potential for growth
in the credit industry. However, results of the survey con-
ducted as part of this study question this growth potential.
Only 37% of the banks and 7% of the credit unions returning
the questionnaires used the systems, which, for banks, is
about the same percentage as in 19 67. Furthermore, the per-
centage of banks considering using scoring is currently 11%,
down from- 33% in 1967. Finally, a trend that shows a signif-
icant percentage of institutions quitting scoring has been
shown. These results would indicate that the credit scoring
technique is, at least in the banking industry, in a period
of stagnation. No comment regarding the growth potential of
scoring in credit unions can be made because of the small
number of current users and because no past studies of former
usage were available. It must be- pointed out that this sur-
vey deals only with the 100 largest banks and 100 largest
federal credit unions. Finance companies, credit bureaus,
and other consumer lenders, would also have to be queried in
order to arrive at any meaningful appraisal of current usage
and potential for growth of scoring.
54

VI. EFFECT ON SERVICEMEN
A. SYSTEM DESIGN TRADEOFFS
A scoring system that is specifically designed for a
particular lending institution and tailored to the character-
istics of the customers of that institution should be more
effective than a system designed for the institution's indus-
try as a whole. The degree of uniformity of the particular
institution's customers can have an effect on the accuracy
of the scoring system. An institution with branches in di-
verse geographic and economic areas or with diverse types of
customers may need separate scoring systems for each area or
type. An increase in the number of systems means an increase
in design and maintenance costs. Of course there is also a
limit to the value of information received by further strat-
ification. Separate systems for plumbers, carpenters, and
welders may not provide significantly more information toward
determining good and bad loans than a single system for skilled
workers. Therefore, lending institutions who have a system
or systems designed specifically for their potential customers
must make certain cost effective tradeoff decisions. Occa-
sionally these decisions may adversely affect a certain seg-
ment of their potential customer population.
B. MILITARY CUSTOMERS
Occupation itself is usually not a very good discrimina-
ting characteristic of loan risk as was pointed out in Ref. 20.
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For this reason, most credit scoring systems do not address
occupation itself, but seek to determine those characteris-
tics of the applicant that best discriminate between the good
and bad risks. These characteristics have been aptly described
subjectively as the three c's of credit -- character, capa-
bility, and collateral.
Character and capability are also referred to as stabil-
ity and ability. The authors felt that there are certain
aspects of the military service that prevent the serviceman
from being scored fairly in these areas. Numerous questions
relating to stability are frequently asked such as -- Do you
own a home?, How long have you lived at your present address?,
How long have you resided in this state?, Do you have a home
phone?, etc. The serviceman may be living in government
quarters. If he is single he may be living in the barracks
or the Bachelor Officer Quarters. These men seldom have a
phone other than the barracks or BOQ phone at the respective
desks. If he is assigned to a ship his ship's phone is only
available for outside usage during in-port periods . If the
serviceman has lived at his present address for two years
the chances are good that he is due for a new duty station
shortly. It is not unreasonable to assume that at any partic-
ular point in a serviceman's career the answer to the question
— Have you lived at your present address more than two
years? -- would be negative more often than not. These fre-
quent moves are often out of state moves.
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Seemingly easy questions regarding ability can be mis-
leading when the potential loan customer is a serviceman.
Even the question -- How much money do you make? -- can be
a cloudy issue. When filling out the loan application the
serviceman may not be able to provide an appropriate answer
to that question. Even if he recalls the exact amount of
his take home pay, there may be allotments automatically
being taken out of his total pay for sayings, loans, insurance,
or miscellaneous purposes that he does not remember on the
spot. The loan officer or the serviceman may have an up to
date copy of the military pay scale to determine the base
pay for his particular rate or rank and length of service.
This figure, however, does not include various allowances
for subsistence, quarters, hazardous duty pay, or any profi-
ciency pay to which the serviceman may or may not be entitled.
Even assuming that the correct pay figure has been determined,
there is some question as to its validity in comparison to
civilian pay. Recent efforts have been made to raise the
earnings of the military serviceman to that of his civilian
counterpart. Many of the military benefits do not equate
directly to dollars earned. Increased benefits for the mili-
tary man due to medical care, exchange, and commissary privi-
leges may make the same pay figure for the serviceman and
his civilian counterpart incomparable. Should not this hid-
den purchasing power of the military pay figure be taken into




The purpose of this part of the thesis is to test the
following hypothesis: "Since servicemen move more frequently
than the population at large, often live in government quar-
ters or rent instead of owning their own home, and receive
much of their compensation as fringe benefits; they are not
likely to be treated fairly by credit scoring systems". Cer-
tainly there are exceptions to the assumptions made by the
authors. Many officers and senior enlisted personnel do own
their own homes. Some personnel have been able to have pro-
longed tours of duty and different assignments in the same
area. - It is felt to be exceptional, however, for a service-
man to reside in the same home for more than three or four
consecutive years.
Granting the above assumptions, the fact that servicemen
score low in certain stability and ability areas is not con-
clusive evidence that they are not treated fairly by these
consumer credit scoring systems. Servicemen may score high
enough on other questions in these and other areas to counter-
act the low scoring questions. Thus, their overall score may
be high enough to pass if it is a loan/no loan or credit/ no
credit type decision. They are still penalized somewhat if
the total score determines the absolute limit of credit avail-
able such as for a charge account or credit card.
D. SAMPLE
To test the hypothesis the authors drew a sample of loans
made by the Monterey Peninsula Navy Federal Credit Union,
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Monterey, California. This credit union, founded in 196 8,
has grown to over 6,000 members with total assets of over
$4% million.
1. Good Loans
The sample consists of 100 good loans made for the
purpose of purchasing new or used automobiles by active duty
servicemen. The authors 1 rather strict definition of a "good
loan" is that there has never been a late payment. These
loans have either been successfully completed or were due
for completion within a few months. The servicemen were pre-
dominantly Navy and Army personnel assigned to the Naval Post-
graduate' School, the Defense Language Institute, or Fort Ord.
Officers comprised 41% of the 100 sample good loans. Of the
59% enlisted loans, 26% were of paygrades E1-E4 and 33% were
E5 and above. These are reasonable stratification levels
that can usually distinguish between first term and career
enlisted personnel. Of the total 100 automobile loans 72%




The sample also consists of 21 bad loans defined as
those loans which have been delinquent for at least 60 days
consecutively. This does not imply that these payments will
not be made up or that the loan will not repay principal.
Nine of the bad loans were for new cars (4 3% of the total)
,
and twelve were for used cars (57% of the total) . Of the 21
bad loan customers three or 14% were officers, nine or 43%
were E1-E4, and nine or 4 3% were E5 and above. A larger
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number of bad loans would have been desirable for the purposes
of the survey. Only 21 loans met the criteria as "bad" that
were for automobiles purchased by an active duty serviceman.
To redefine bad loans as delinquency for 30 or 45 days would
have severely lessened the differentiation between good and
bad loans. It should be pointed out that automobile loans
(especially when the cars themselves are used as collateral)
are very safe types of loans. Household improvement, where
the house may be collateral, is the only other type of loan
that might be safer. These are the type of loan payments
that people with financial problems will attempt to make
first. Other types of consumer loans such as for furniture,
vacation trips, and recreational vehicles will be the first
to suffer. Since the car itself can provide adequate collat-
eral and the customer is usually most unwilling to have it
repossessed, automobile loans are among the easiest loans to
obtain. The choice of automobile loans for the sample was
made to assure an adequate degree of uniformity for compari-
son of other characteristics of the loan applicants.
3. Turndowns
To complete the sample the authors included 21 turn-
downs. These were military personnel who applied for a loan
by the local credit union for the purpose of purchasing a
car but were refused the loans. Here the number twenty-one
was strictly for convenience. Of the 21 turndowns four or
19% were for new cars and seventeen or 81% were for used cars.
None of the turndowns were officers. Eighteen or 86% of them




The scoring systems of three lending institutions, felt
to be representative, were chosen to test each of the sample
loan applicants. The information on the sample loan applica-
tions was sufficient to properly score each of the applicants
on each of the three representative systems. Two of the sys-
tems are from large banks that do have branch operations loca-
ted in the same geographic area as the sample loan applicants.
The third lending institution is not located in the same
geographic area as the applicants, but has a system that was
specifically designed for a credit union with military mem-
bers. To prevent the divulging of any competitive secrets
the institutions shall be referred to as Bank X, Bank Y, and
Credit Union A.
1. Bank X
Bank X employs a fairly formal scoring system. While
it is possible that a customer with a lower than the set cut-
off score may be granted the loan, it would be exceptional.
Likewise it would be highly unlikely that a customer be denied
a loan if he has a score exceeding the cutoff. There are
three questions in this scoring system that the authors identi-
fied as potentially unfair for military personnel. On one of
them, points are awarded if real estate is owned and no points
are given for a negative answer. The others ask about the
applicant's time at present address and time on job. If the
previous job or previous address are not out of state, they
may be included. Points are awarded on either of these ques-
tions if their respective times are two years or more.
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The possible adverse effects on servicemen of the
question regarding years on the job can be illustrated by the
case of a sailor who has been in the Navy for, say, ten years.
During this time he has probably had several moves and has
had several billets on each of the different bases or ships
to which he has been assigned. When asked the question —
"How long have you been on your present job?" — he may well
respond with one year, the time he has spent on his current
billet as a metalsmith in the airframes division of the lo-
cally based aviation squadron. Or, he might respond with
ten years
t
the time he has been employed by Uncle Sam. Clear-
ly the ten year answer is more advantageous to the sailor,
but he may not realize it. In this case it is not clear
what answer the lending institution desires. If the sailor
is puzzled as to the questions intent, he might ask the loan
officer. Here, it is possible that the loan officer's inter-
pretation of the question can vary from individual to individ-
ual. It could also vary from area to area depending on the
number of military personnel stationed in the particular area
and the individual lending institution's experience with, or
preconceptions of, military customers.
It was of course impossible for the authors to attempt
to evaluate the lending institution's intentions. This ques-
tion was therefore scored for each of the sample applicants
to the serviceman's favor with total time of continuous mili-
tary active duty service. It is however, felt that the
potentially discriminatory characteristics of the question




Bank Y's scoring system is somewhat more informal
than X's. It states that its system is more of a guide to
the loan officer. Attaining a good score does not prevent
the loan officer from refusing the loan for his own reasons
or observations. Likewise, it is conceivable that a person
with a low score could still be granted the loan. A good
example of this might be a young person just starting his
career who had not had the opportunity to build up much cred-
it experience. There are exceptions to the system, therefore,
and it cannot be considered hardfast and automatic pass/fail.
The system is actually broken down into three sec-
tions. Questions in one section deal almost entirely with
stability. The other sections deal with ability and a measure
of the applicant's credit rating. The possible confusion re-
garding military pay as a measure of ability has previously
been discussed. This scoring system did in fact recognize
the increased purchasing power of military pay from fringe
benefits. Actual military pay was increased by a factor of
.25 to attempt to match the earning power of the serviceman
to his civilian counterpart. The authors felt that this
adequately covered any charge of discrimination in the abil-
ity section. Actually this factor may be overly favorable
to the serviceman. Some of the increased purchasing power
of military pay due to fringe benefits may actually be off-
set by other increased incidental expenses caused by frequent
moves, uniform upkeep, etc.
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The ability score is determined on an income to outgo
basis. Since the serviceman's income was adjusted upward by
the .25 factor, the usage of this section of the system was
not questioned. If a serviceman has a poor income to outgo
ratio he is just as bad a credit risk as a civilian with the
same ratio. Especially so in this case, where the service-
man's income figure has been adjusted.
The same logic holds true for the section dealing
with the applicant's previous credit rating. Here, Bank Y
utilized external investigative information of various degrees
to determine the previous credit rating of the applicant. A
poor credit rating is equally bad for a serviceman or a civil-
ian. Obviously, the authors did not conduct a post facto
credit investigation on each of the sample loan applicants.
Since the assumption was made that there was no obvious evi-
dence of discrimination in this area, all of the loans were
scored in favor of the servicemen. A bad credit rating in
this area results in the subtraction of points from the total
score. No points were deducted in this area. Thus it is
entirely possible that if Bank Y had actually scored the appli-
cants, more of the loans would have been rejected than the
sample results indicate.
The stability section of this system includes ques-
tions that can be potentially unfair to the serviceman. In
particular these questions are whether or not you own or are
buying a home, and whether or root you have a home telephone
in your own name. This system avoids the "how long on present
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job" possible confusion by phrasing the question, "How long
have you been currently employed?" Once again, regardless
of possible confusion the authors scored this question in
favor of the serviceman and gave each applicant credit for
his total time on continuous active duty.
3. Credit Union A
If the discrimination hypothesis is true we would
expect that military members would fare better on the system
designed specifically for the serviceman than on the two
civilian systems. This is especially true since this system
does not ask if you rent a home or how long you have lived
at your present address. It asks for a telephone, but it
does not have to be an account in your own name. Giving the
ship's duty phone or the barracks phone is ample evidence for
them that you are not attempting to evade being located in
the future. It is admittedly a better indication of good
credit to have passed the telephone company's hurdle of being
accepted as a customer. This is however, quite impractical
for someone living on a ship or in the barracks.
The sample of 100 good loans, 21 bad loans, and 21
turndowns was each scored on Bank X, Bank Y, and Credit Union
A systems. Particular attention in the analysis will be
placed on those questions of Bank X and Bank Y previously
earmarked, i.e., years at present address and ownership of






The Bank X scoring system failed 13 of the 100 good
loans. It also failed ten of the 21 bad loans and 15 of the
21 turndowns.
a. Good Loans
Of the 13 good loans turned down 2 3% were for
used cars and 77% were for new cars which very closely approx-
imates the 100 good loan sample of 72% new and 28% used cars.
Also of the same 13 good loans that failed, six were E1-E4,



























The largest percentage of good loans that failed
belonged to the E1-E4 category which was the smallest percent-































E1-E4 9 43% 7 33%
E5-up 9 43% 2 9%
Officers
_3 14% _JL 5%
21 100% 10 47%
The majority of the bad seven out of ten that the
Bank X system earmarked as bad loans were located in the El-
E4 category.
c. Turndowns
Initial Initial # of % of sample
# of % of turndowns turndowns
Category turndowns turndowns that failed that failed
new 4 19% 3 14%
used 17 81% 12 57%
21 100% 15 71%
E1-E4 18 86% 12 57%












Bank Y rejected 20 of the 100 good loans, 13 of 21
or 62% of the bad loans, and 20 of 21 or 95% of the turndowns.
Although failure in any one of the three sections of this
system (stability, ability, total score after credit rating)
results in rejection, only stability and ability will be ex-
amined. Since none of the total scores were lowered for credit
rating in the sample, it was impossible for an applicant to
pass both the stability and ability sections and simultan-
eously fail the total score section. All rejections are there-




Of the 20 good loans that were rejected 14 failed



















E1-E4 26 12 3






Here again as in Bank X the largest number of
good loans that failed (15 of 20 or 75%) were in the E1-E4
category which actually comprised only 26% of the 100 good
loan sample.
b. Bad Loans
Bank Y rejected 13 of the 21 bad loans or 69%.
Ten failed the stability section and eight failed for abil-












new 9 43% 2 10% 3 14%
used 12 57%
_JB 38% 5 24%
21 100% 10 48% 8 38%
E1-E4 9 43% 9 43% 5 24%





21 100% 10 48% 8 38%
Of the five rejections that failed both the sta-
bility and the ability sections, one was for a new car and
the other four were for used cars. All five were in the El-
E4 category. Therefore, nine of the 13 or 69% of the bad
loans rejected were in this category which comprised 43% of




Bank Y rejected 20 of the 21 turndowns. Eighteen








































3. Credit Union A
Credit Union A rejected five of the 100 sample good
loans, four of the 21 or 19% of the bad loans, and 10 of the
21 or 48% of the turndowns. All of the rejections in each of
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E1-E4 9 43% 4 19%
E5-up ' 9 43% -
Officers 3 14% -













new 4 19% -
used 17 81% 10 48%
21 100% 10 48%
E1-E4 18 86% 10 48%










The following table is a summary of the number and percent-
age of rejections in each of the three sample categories as
pertaining to each lending institution. The Bank Y statistics
pertain to the stability section of its scoring system.
Good loans Bad loans Turndowns
rejected rejected re j ected
• 13 13% 10
Q.
_#
15Bank X 48% 71%
Bank Y 14 14% 10 48% 18 86%
Credit Union A 5 5% 4 19% 10 48%
It can be seen that Credit Union A clearly rejects the
fewest of the good loans. It also rejects the least, thus
accepting the most of the bad loans and the turndowns. When
evaluating scoring systems, it is not enough to consider only
the number of good loans accepted. Attention must also be
given to the number of bad loans accepted.
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The increase in the number of bad loans accepted subtracts
from the gain received from accepting more good loans. No
system can be expected to perfectly pick out all the good and
all the bad loans. Each of these institutions choose their
particular cutoff points with the expectations of maximizing
their return. Having a system that would absolutely refuse
all bad loans would ordinarily result in a lowering of total
profit because many marginal applicants that turn out as
profitable business would be lost. The setting of each insti-
tution's cutoff is dependent on management policy as well as
their estimated individual loan margin and overhead costs of
bad loans.
Figure 1 is an attempt to show the discriminating power
(ability to distinguish good from bad risks) of each of the
systems. The cutoff scores that gave each of the systems a
particular number of bad loans accepted was related to the
number of good loans rejected for that same cutoff score.
Thus, the systems can be compared considering the overall
effect of lessening good loans rejection with the accompany-
ing increase of bad loans acceptance.
It appears from figure 1 that Bank X dominates with a
lower number of good loans rejected for most all numbers of
bad loans accepted. Therefore, although Credit Union A*s
cutoff is chosen so that it accepts most of the good loans,
it also accepts most of the bad loans. Bank X actually does
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A closer look needs to be taken of the systems of Bank X
and Bank Y as to the possibility of the particular questions
previously identified being discriminatory and thus influ-
encing the overall results.
1. Bank X
Of the 100 sample good loans only 30 received points
for living at their present addresses (including previous
address, if in same state) for two years or more. Of the 13
good loans that failed only one received points for this ques-
tion. If another question was substituted that gave all of
the military personnel credit for this question, the number
of 100 good loans that fail would be reduced from 13 to 8.
There would be a corresponding increase in the number of 21
bad loans accepted from 11 to 13. Acceptance of turndowns
would increase from 6 to 12 of 21.
Only 29 of the 100 sample good loans received points
for the question concerning the ownership of real estate
(whether mortgaged or not) . None of the 13 good loans that
failed received any credit here. If they had, only four of
the 100 good loans would have failed. Correspondently , bad
loans accepted would have increased from 11 of 21 to 15 of
21 and turndowns acceptance would increase from 6 to 12 out
of 21.
2. Bank Y
Seventy-nine of the 100 sample good loans received
points for having a phone listed in their own name. Fifteen
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of the 21 bad loans and six of the 21 turndowns also received
points for this question. It would appear that this may be
an appropriate question. A test was made to determine the
effect of allowing a barracks or BOQ phone number. Only one
of the 13 good loans that failed had received points for a
phone. Seven others did have barracks phones listed on their
applications and four of the seven had a sufficient score to
pass with the inclusion of points from the barracks phone.
The number of good loans that failed would thus be reduced
from 13 to 9 of the 100 good loans. Bad loans accepted would
have inc reased by one and turndowns accepted would stay the
same at three of 21.
Only 24 of the 100 sample good loans received points
for owning a home. None of the 13 good loans that failed re-
ceived any points for this question. If value (question's
weight depended on equity in the home) was given which cor-
responded to a minimum of 10% equity , only six of the 100
good loans would have failed. Bad loans accepted would have
increased from 11 to 16 of 21 and turndowns accepted from
three to six.
3. Overall Test
As with figure 1, figure 2 is a test of the three
systems overall discriminating ability. This time the sys-
tems are calculated without the possibly discriminating ques-
tions of Bank X and Bank Y.
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(Credit Union A now
the best discriminator
at Banks X & Y cutoff
policy)
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All of the systems appear to point at the used car and
the El to E4 categories as being high risk with a correspond-
ingly low chance of acceptance. This is reasonable since the
used car does not offer collateral comparable to a new car,
and E1-E4 personnel have had little time to build proof of
stability and ability.
The sample results have not conclusively proved or dis-
proved the hypothesis. Although Credit Union A accepted more
of the good loans, Bank X appeared to be the more discrimina-
ting. In iddition to the size of the 21 bad loan sample,
the discrimination tests were subject to some limitations
due to the authors' definition of bad. A sixty-day delinquent
loan is probably a good money-maker. Only one of the 21 bad
loans was actually an uncollectable write-off. Even the
turndowns may not be a fair indicator. The sample credit
union may be very conservative. Credit Union A appears to
be far from conservative. It is reasonable for the credit
union, which is more service than profit oriented, to look
more favorably on their own members and accept more risk than
the banks.
The findings of this study will not prompt any civilian
lending institution into restructuring their scoring system
for the prospective military customer. It could, however,
influence the loan officer to make exceptions to borderline
situations if the serviceman has provided a barracks phone
number, lives in government quarters, or has been forced to
move frequently due to changes of duty station.
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This study should also be of considerable value to the
serviceman applying for a loan. Questions as to time on job
or pay should be answered truthfully, but to his advantage.
If he does fail, it may be worthwhile to call the accompany-
ing unstable characteristics of the military service to the












CREDIT EVALUATION CUSTOMER SCORE




31 yrs. -60 yrs. 5
B. MARITAL
STATUS
C. RESIDENCE Board 1
Rent 4
Own 8
D. LENGTH AT to 6 months 1
RESIDENCE 6 mos . to 3 yrs. 5
3 yrs. and over 10




F. LENGTH OF to 6 months 1
EMPLOYMENT 6 mos . to 3 yrs
.
8
3 yrs. and over 15
G. MONTHLY $225 to $299 5
INCOME $300 to $399 10
$400 to $650 15
H. BANK ACCT. Checking 1
Saving 2
TOTAL POINTS
If credit evaluation score is 40 or under, the customer must
be considered a poor risk and should be rejected.
If credit evaluation score is between 41 and 65 , customer can
be sold but good judgment must be used on amount.
If credit evaluation score is 66 or higher, and all other
qualifications have been met, customer can be considered





MONTEREY. CALIFORNIA - 93940 in reply refer to :
NC4(36)/ec
2700
J 5 AUG 1973
Dear Sir:
Two students in the Financial Management Curriculum at this school
are writing a master's thesis on the subject of consumer credit. As
part of their thesis they are evaluating scoring systems used by finan-
cial institutions in granting loans.
Lieutenant Commander T. L. Johnson, SC, USN, and Lieutenant Commander
W. S. Wojtkowski, USN, have designed the enclosed questionnaire in order
to sample some of the larger lenders in their use of scoring systems.
Specifically, they hope to trace the widespread use of scoring systems
as consumer credit has grown in the last 40 years. Additionally, they
hope to analyze several scoring systems as they affect members of the
Naval service.
While insisting on selection and pursuit of meaningful thesis projects
by advanced degree candidates, the Postgraduate School does not desire to
impose an administrative burden on any other activity. However, response
to the subject questionnaire may provide a significant contribution to the
study of consumer lending techniques.
Replies to the questionnaire will be used only for the purpose of this
research and will not be specifically identifiable within the thesis. It
is requested that the questionnaire be returned directly to the students.
The work being done by the two students is purely academic in nature.
The questionnaires will be destroyed upon thesis publication.
Any additional information or comment you may have that you feel would
be meaningful to this thesis project is requested and encouraged. Any
questions regarding the questionnaire should be addressed to LCDR T. L.
Johnson or LCDR W. S. Wojtkowski at telephone number 408-646-2536 and/or
by writing to them at Student Mail Center, Box 2297, Naval Postgraduate
School, Monterey, California 93940.










The purpose of this survey is to gain data regarding scor-
ing systems used in granting consumer credit. To illustrate,
using a scoring system a loan applicant's characteristics are
measured based on information about him that appears on the
loan application blank. A single numerical score is computed
which indicates to the loan officer a possible course of ac-
tion (i.e., grant the loan, seek further information, or turn
down the loan)
.
The above should be kept in mind when filling out the ques-
tions below.
1. When reviewing consumer loan applications, does your firm
utilize a numerical scoring system which gives a single score
based on the applicant's characteristics?
YES (if yes, please advance to question 4)
NO
2. Has your firm ever used such a system in the past?
YES
NO
3. Is your firm presently considering such a system?
YES
NO
THANK YOU FOR YOUR COOPERATION. YOU NEED NOT PROCEED FURTHER.
4. Do you utilize the scoring system for the following types
of loans:





Other Type (if yes, please specify type
i.e., RV, boat, aircraft, etc.)
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5. With the use of your scoring system, have you any evidence
of improved operation?
Yes, we have evidence of improved operation in the




other (please specify below)
Although we have not accumulated concrete evidence,
we do feel that the scoring system has aided our
operation.
No evidence of improvement exists.
6. How long have you been using a numerical scoring system?
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